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Abstract
During interaction with others, we perceive and produce so-
cial actions in close temporal distance or even simultaneously.
It has been argued that the motor system is involved in both
processes, but how does it distinguish in this processing be-
tween self and other? In this paper, we present a model of
self-other distinction within a hierarchical sensorimotor sys-
tem that is based on principles of perception-action coupling
and predictive processing. For this we draw on mechanisms as-
sumed for the integration of cues to generate sense of agency,
i.e., the sense that an action is self-generated. We report re-
sults from simulations of different social scenarios, showing
that the model is able to solve the problem of the dual use of
the sensorimotor system.
Keywords: perception-action coupling; social cognition; mir-
roring; dual-use; sense of agency; predictive processing
Introduction
In everyday social interaction we constantly try to deduce
and predict the underlying intentions behind others’ social
actions, like facial expressions, speech, gestures, or body
posture. This is no easy problem and the underlying cog-
nitive mechanisms and neural processes even have been
dubbed the ,,dark matter” of social neuroscience (Przyrembel,
Smallwood, Pauen, & Singer, 2012). Action recognition
is commonly believed to rest upon principles of prediction-
based processing (Clark, 2013), where predictions about ex-
pected sensory stimuli are continuously formed and evaluated
against incoming sensory input to inform further processing.
Such a predictive processing does not only inform our per-
ception of actions of others, but also our action production in
which we constantly predict the sensory consequences of our
own actions and correct them in case of deviations.
Both of these processes draw on the human motor sys-
tem constituting a perception-action coupling (Prinz, 1997).
However, in dynamic social interaction, perception and pro-
duction often need to be at work simultaneously and for both,
actions of self and other. How does the sensorimotor system
distinguish between self and other? And how does it inter-
play with higher-level cognitive processes like mentalizing to
solve this social differentiation problem?
As of yet, it is not clear how exactly self-other distinction
is implemented within the motor system, but there is evidence
for a differentiated involvement supporting the motor sys-
tem’s key role in social cognition (Schu¨tz-Bosbach, Mancini,
Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006). We aim to contribute a com-
putational modeling perspective. In previous work we de-
vised a model of the interplay of mentalizing and prediction-
based mirroring during social interaction. It demonstrated
how mentalizing – even with minimal abilities to account for
beliefs, desires and intentions – affords interactive grounding
and makes communication more robust and efficient (Kahl &
Kopp, 2015). In that work two virtual agents interacted in a
communication game, each of which equipped with models
of a mirroring system and mentalizing system, respectively.
In this paper we present an extension of the prediction-
based model of the sensorimotor system to enable it to dif-
ferentiate actions of its own from the interaction partner’s
actions. We start with briefly introducing the hierarchical,
prediction-based model of a sensorimotor system. Then we
discuss how this model can be extended to deal with con-
current perception and production in social situations. This
includes a basic ability to integrate predictive and postdictive
cues to form a sense of agency (SoA) that helps to differen-
tiate between self and other. Finally, we present and discuss
results from simulation studies of different simple scenarios,
which test the model’s ability to infer SoA for its own actions.
Computational model of a sensorimotor system
Like other attempts to model the motor system, we chose to
make use of a hierarchical representation of increasing ab-
stractions over motor commands (Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato,
2003; Sadeghipour & Kopp, 2010). In a three-level hier-
archy (see Figure 1), we represent motor primitives on the
lowest level (MPrim), followed by a motor sequence layer
(MSeq), and motor schemas on the topmost level of abstrac-
tion (MSchema). Motor primitives represent single move-
ment segments in space, motor sequences store lists of motor
primitives, while motor schemas represent abstract clusters of
motor sequences grouped by similarity. We assume that these
representations are the basis for a prediction-based model of
sensorimotor processing which underlies both action percep-
tion and production. To this end, we assume the representa-
tions to be multimodal, i.e., combining visual, motor and pro-
prioceptive aspects of action, if available. Consequently, they
are used as more or less high-level or visuomotor represen-
tations of action and their outcomes. During action percep-
tion, we further assume that the correspondence problem is
solved in the sense that an observed action by another agent
is mapped into one’s own self-centered frame of reference.
That is, we feed the perceived action trajectory directly and
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Figure 1: The predictive sensorimotor hierarchy, based on
predictive processing and perception-action coupling. Pre-
dictions are sent top-down from state nodes (S) and will be
compared to sensory evidence in error nodes (E) in order to
drive updates within the hierarchy.
Sequence matching
In the current model motor primitives are matched against
sensory input, which is assumed to consist of a sequence of
the last two perceived input coordinates. Motor sequences
are matched against a temporary motor sequence concur-
rently collected from the motor primitive layer, yielding a
best match and a prediction of the next motor primitive in the
sequence. Motor schemas are likewise matched against the
currently best matching motor sequence. In the case of the
motor primitives, before the best match is searched, the input
sequence is linearly interpolated to match the length of the
motor primitives and it is scaled and translated to match the
motor primitive’s position and size in its coordinate system.
Sub-sequence matching is solved by applying euclidean dis-
tance measures, which provides high accuracy in our domain
size. The same matching algorithm is used for comparing
motor sequences in the motor schema layer.
Predictive sensorimotor hierarchy
The model realizes a predictive processing account resting
upon assumptions of the predictive brain hypotheses (Clark,
2013). To that end, it stores representations in the form of
discrete probability distributions that can be influenced both
bottom-up, in the form of evidence for its last prediction from
the next lower layer, and top-down in the form of a prediction
by the next higher layer. Following the assumption that the
main flow of information is top-down and that motor control
is also just top-down sensory prediction, described as ”action-
oriented predictive processing”, or ”active inference” (Clark,
2013), all layers receive the next higher layer’s prediction and
evaluate it for their own bottom-up prediction in the next time
step.
As shown in Figure 1, in any time step, the top layer is the
first to update its discrete probability distribution in the state
node (S), given its prior distribution (St−1) and the likelihood,
calculated in the error node (E) based on the evidence from
the layer below. The updated state node (St ) will be used as
a prediction for the current time step, influencing the layer
below as a prior, and a copy will be stored in the error node
for comparison in the next time step:
S(MSchema)t = S(MSchema)t−1E(MSeq)t−1.
Next, the state node at the layer of motor sequences will be
updated given its prior distribution, the prediction from the
motor schema layer and the likelihood, calculated from the
evidence in the layer below:
S(MSeq)t = S(MSchema)tS(MSeq)t−1E(MPrim)t−1.
The resulting posterior distribution will be sent as prediction
to the layer below, and as evidence to the layer above. Finally,
the state node at the motor primitive layer will receive an up-
date given its prior from the last time step, the posterior from
the motor sequence layer and the likelihood of the received
sensory evidence (o) given all motor primitives:
S(MPrim)t = S(MSeq)tS(MPrim)t−1E(o).
For a better understanding of the process of how the model
matches the input to its hierarchical representation, see Fig-
ure 2. We have recorded handwritten capital letters using
a graphical tablet. All sequences of drawing the 26 char-
acters of the alphabet are stored with a sampling rate of 25
frames per second. From this dataset (12 primitives, mapping
onto 26 sequences, mapping onto 26 schemas) we can trigger
the model to draw a character, and simulate the model per-
ceiving somebody’s drawing of a character in real-time (by
simply feeding the trajectories into the system as input one
coordinate after the other). Figure 2 depicts three steps in
the prediction-based recognition process that leads to a high
probability of perceiving the drawn character.
Precision
The sensorimotor hierarchy learns motor sequences and mo-
tor schemas online, with each layer having to decide whether
to add a new representation or not. One cognitively plausible
tFigure 2: Prediction-based recognition process of the charac-
ter L being drawn: black dots indicate input coordinates, red
dotted lines represent matched motor primitives.
way to determine the need to extend upon the available mo-
tor representations is to calculate the precision of each layer’s
prediction against the evidence in the next time step. Friston
and Frith (2015) used precision (the inverse of the variance
between prior and posterior probability distributions) as a sort
of cortical gain control or neuro-modulation, as to control the
influence of the feedback that their Songbird models received
upon their song production. We use it as a measure of how
well our model can predict its environment and update or ex-
tend it according to how similar the prior (P = St−1) and pos-
terior (Q = St ) are:
Pr(P,Q) = 1Var(Q−P)
This enables each layer to evaluate its predictive power and,
by thresholding, to decide whether to extend its repertoire.
Active inference
Following the assumption that overt action is basically action-
oriented predictive processing (Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner,
& Kiebel, 2010), we allow high-precision prediction at the
layer of motor primitives to be acted out. This leads to overt
and automatic enactment of correctly predicted actions, sim-
ilar to the automatic imitation seen in patients suffering from
echopraxia (Ganos, Ogrzal, Schnitzler, & Mu¨nchau, 2012).
To control this motor execution, we introduced a signal into
the top-layer of the hierarchy, which acts as a motor intention
for a specific motor schema, including a strong boost of this
motor schema’s probability. This percolates down the hierar-
chy to boost associated representations and informs about the
intention to act. Once it reaches the lowest layer of the hierar-
chy, and combined with the high precision threshold, the act
to produce the motor representation will be allowed.
With the hierarchical model in place, we set out to find
mechanisms to distinguish activations that stem from own ac-
tion from those arising due to the interaction partner’s action.
One way is to make sure that the perceived action outcomes
are correctly attributed. That is, we need to look at creating
SoA, i.e., the sense that an action is self-generated.
Self-other distinction and sense of agency
How does the human brain distinguish between information
about ourselves and others? Or to be more specific, how can
we distinguish ourselves from others so that we do not falsely
attribute an action outcome to ourselves? These questions
pertain to the more general mechanisms that give rise to a
sense of “feeling of control”, agency, and “self”. Generally,
a person’s SoA is believed to be influenced through predic-
tive and postdictive (inferential) processes, which when dis-
turbed can lead to misattributions of actions as in disorders as
for example in patients suffering from schizophrenia (van der
Weiden, Prikken, & van Haren, 2015). We aim to identify
mechanisms in order to model these processes and their inte-
gration into a combined SoA.
The predictive process makes use of people’s ability to an-
ticipate the sensory consequences of their own actions. It al-
lows to suppress, i.e., decrease the intensity of incoming sig-
nals which enables people to distinguish between self-caused
actions and their outcomes and those actions and outcomes
caused by others. One account to model these processes is
based on inverse and forward models to account for disor-
ders of awareness in the motor system and delusion of control
(Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). This view suggests that
patients can no longer link their intentions to their actions,
that is they are conscious of their intention, but not of the sen-
sory consequences of the action. As research into schizophre-
nia has shown, reliable and early self-other integration and
distinction is important not only for the correct attribution of
SoA, but also in turn for the correct attribution of intentions
and emotions in social interactions. This even suggests that
the attenuation of perceived sensory outcomes correlates with
activation in the mirror neuron system (van der Weiden et al.,
2015). Weiss, Herwig, and Schu¨tz-Bosbach (2011) showed
that there is a social aspect to predictive processes that influ-
ence SoA by comparing perceived loudness of auditory action
effects in an interactive action context. They found that atten-
uation occured also in the interactive context, comparable to
the attentuation of self-generated sound in an individual con-
text.
The postdictive process relies more on inferences drawn af-
ter the movement in order to infer whether our intentions are
contingent and consistent with the observed events (Wegner
& Wheatley, 1999) and is also influenced by higher-level
causal beliefs and thoughts. One important aspect of this
inferential process relies on the temporal aspects of action-
outcome integration. It was shown that increasing action out-
come delay decreases feeling of control (Sidarus, Chambon,
& Haggard, 2013). This is related to the “temporal binding
window” (Colonius & Diederich, 2004), in which the sensory
signals related to the outcome of an action are integrated. The
width of the window is dependend on the predictability of the
action outcome. Since we have more experience in predicting
our own body, the temporal binding window is more narrow
for own action outcomes than for other people’s actions. Be-
ing able to make such a distinction allows people to monitor,
infer and distinguish between causal relations for own and
other’s behavior. Another aspect informing the postdictive
process relies on the valence attributed to an action outcome,
where positive valence of an action outcome leads to stronger
SoA (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013).
In sum, there are two processes that can inform SoA and
hence can help to distinguish actions of self and other in so-
cial interaction. A predictive process works on the content
of the action, e.g., the motor command and utilizes forward
models as a mechanism to predict the to-be-produced mo-
tor command. A postdictive process works with higher-level
causal beliefs like the intention to act and temporal binding as
mechanisms to infer the consistency of the action outcome.
But how do these two processes work together to inform
SoA and what if their cues are unreliable? Cue integration
was first studied by Moore, Wegner, and Haggard (2009) who
found that when predictive cues are absent external cues be-
come more influential. Nahab et al. (2010) found in an imag-
ing study that there is a leading and a lagging network that
both influence SoA prior to and after an action. The lead-
ing network would check whether a predicted action out-
come would be perceived, while the lagging network would
make use of these cues to further process SoA leading to
its conscious experience. It seems that in order to generate
SoA, both systems do not necessarily have to work perfectly
together, as there is evidence for a weighted integration of
cues for agency based on their reliability (Moore & Fletcher,
2012). Also, if the reliability of the predictive process was
reduced, the system put more weight on the postdictive infer-
ential processes (Wolpe et al., 2014). Furthermore, the flu-
ency of action-selection processes may also inform the self-
other distinction, because the success of repeatedly predicting
the next actions seem to accumulate over time to inform SoA
(Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014).
Modeling self-other distinction in social
interaction
During online social interaction, the sensorimotor system po-
tentially gets involved in simultaneous action perception and
production processes. Our goal is to investigate how the
prediction-based model can be extended to cope with the so-
cial differentiation problem during such dual-use situations.
To this end, we integrate three cues from the predictive and
postdictive processes into SoA for produced actions: In the
predictive process, we have the match or mismatch of the pre-
dicted action-outcome. In the postdictive process, we have
the intention to act and the delay in the action-outcome for
temporal binding. However, it is not obvious how these cues
are being integrated. As a first step, we test two simple ways
to do so, namely, to connect them conjunctively or disjunc-
tively. A conjunctive connection allows SoA to occur only if
it is supported by both processes; in a disjunctive connection
only one cue suffices to inform SoA, in a more flexible but
potentially more error prone manner.
The predictive mechanism to differentiate self and other
works based on the content of the predictions that are being
sent down the hierarchy. As described above, the predictabil-
ity of actions by itself provides a predictive cue for a feeling
of control, or SoA. Thus, the model needs to quantify the suc-
cess of a prediction about the outcome of an acted-out motor
representation. Since we already have a layer’s precision as a
measure of success of its predictions, we can directly utilize
it as a cue to model SoA.
As the postdictive inferential mechanism we model the
temporal binding window as a Gaussian with its mean (µ) at
the predicted delay, which is informed by the perceived action
duration during learning. The Gaussian’s standard deviation




























Figure 3: A model of self-other distinction based on the pre-
diction of the consequence of an action and the postdictive
integration of an intention to act with the perceived conse-
quence of the action during a predicted temporal binding win-
dow, scaled by the predicting layer’s precision.
In Figure 3 you can see a sketch of how the predictive and
postdictive mechanisms work together to infer SoA for the
produced action and its consequence that is perceived. The
postdictive mechanism for temporal binding will be triggered
by the sensorimotor hierarchy’s intention to produce an ac-
tion, in that it will receive a reference to the motor represen-
tation to anticipate. Information from this motor representa-
tion will then be used to model the temporal binding window.
Now, when the anticipated motor representation is perceived
the delay until this perception occurred (x) will be used to cal-










with σ being scaled by precision (Pr), i.e., trust in the model’s
predictions. The resulting likelihood will be scaled to lhmax,
the Gaussian’s peak. This postdictive cue has to be combined
with the predictive cue of the general precision of the pre-
dictions. We do this by assuming a winner takes all estimate
for the predictive and postdictive cues, with a threshold at
50% probability. Postdictive and predictive cues will then
be connected conjunctively or disjunctiveley to reach an es-
timate for a combined SoA. Since fluency is important for
SoA (Chambon et al., 2014), we will integrate this estimate
over time. The agency estimate will add to the overall SoA
through a simplified Kalman filter,
agencyt(agencyt−1,agencyestimate) =
agencyt−1 +Pr∗ (agencyestimate−agencyt−1).
By allowing the agency estimate (agencyestimate) to influ-
ence the overall SoA (agencyt ) only through this filter, strong
fluctuations are dampened and with a gain controlled by pre-
cision (Pr) the influence of the estimate will strongly depend
on the success of previous predictions. This means that an
agency estimate will either have a strong influence if preci-
sion is high, or SoA can only accumulate slowly if precision
is low.
This is our integrated model of predictive and postdictive
mechanisms which will enable the hierarchical sensorimotor
system to differentiate between actions initiated from self and
others.
Simulations and Results
To test the combined model’s ability to solve the problem of
the dual use of the sensorimotor system and differentiate be-
tween self and other we simulate a limited social situation. In
this situation, the model will write a character while it either
receives the correct action-outcome as feedback, or it receives
delayed or different feedback than expected. This way we
simulate the effect of concurrent perception of an interaction
partner’s action.
We test three scenarios for each combination of predictive
and postdictive cues to form SoA. In the first scenario we
trigger the intent to act out a motor schema and the model
will perceive its own correct output as feedback. Here, the
model will receive both cues correctly. In the second scenario
we trigger the same intent to act, but now the model receives
feedback with a delay, disrupting the postdictive cue. In the
third scenario the model will again be triggered to act, while
this time it receives unpredicted action-outcomes. Here, the
model can receive correct cues only accidentally. The model
will be triggered to produce and perceive the letter L in sce-
nario one and two. In scenario three, the model will perceive
the letter M being produced instead. We log the calculated
SoA over time for each scenario.
The resulting plots in Figure 4 show SoA in the different
scenarios. The upper row shows the resulting plots for the
conjunctive and the lower row for the disjunctive cue integra-
tion. In scenario one, the integration of cues jumps strongly
because predictive precision is high and small irregularities
in timing have a strong effect. The conjunctive connection
of cues does not allow for SoA in scenarios two and three,
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Figure 4: Resulting sense of agency over time for each sce-
nario and each connection between predictive and postdictive
cues.
junctive connection between cues fares better, since it allows
for SoA even when only one of the cues is available.
In dynamic scenarios of concurrent perception and produc-
tion, with feedback either from own or from other’s actions, a
more flexible distinction may be supported by results reported
in the literature. A disjunctive integration is sound with re-
gard to results where the reliability of the predictive process
was reduced and the system put more weight on postdictive
processes (Wolpe et al., 2014). Also, Moore and Fletcher
(2012) found evidence for a weighted integration based on the
cues’ reliability. Another aspect which we found to also influ-
ence our results, was the fluent correct prediction of actions
(Chambon et al., 2014). Especially in the conjunctive sce-
nario one and the disjunctive scenario two, the accumulation
of agency estimates over time was disrupted either through
prediction-error or temporal binding errors.
Taken together, the results show that the model can cor-
rectly attribute its own action outcomes to itself, which con-
tributes to distinguishing itself from an interaction partner.
This differentiating role of the motor system and its strong in-
volvement in social cognition was also proposed by (Schu¨tz-
Bosbach et al., 2006). Our cognitive model and its simulation
results support this suggestion.
Conclusion
We have presented a predictive hierarchical model of the sen-
sorimotor system, integrated with a model of self-other dis-
tinction that can solve the dual-use problem in dynamic social
situations. Furthermore, we presented simulation results of
different scenarios of simultaneous perception and produc-
tion. We compared them to the literature on SoA and the
influence of the motor system on social cognition. This com-
parison suggests that our model can correctly attribute SoA
for its own actions, using a more flexible (disjunctive) inte-
gration of predictive and postdictive cues.
Taken together, our modeling approach supports the mo-
tor system’s role in social cognition. Still, the literature on
the social brain suggests that motor cognition, as well as the
distinction of self and other are influenced by higher level
processes, causal beliefs, and by the mentalizing network.
We agree that the interplay between mentalizing and mir-
roring needs to be incorporated to meet the demands of truly
social systems in interaction scenarios with multiple agents.
In earlier work, we already combined our previous model of
the sensorimotor system with a mentalizing model in a social
scenario with two virtual agents (Kahl & Kopp, 2015).
In future work, we want to improve our setup by making
use of the differentiating information provided by the present
model to inform higher-level cognition through an interplay
with the mentalizing system. We conjecture this interplay can
yield the distinction between one’s own and an interaction
partner’s beliefs needed in social interaction, where informed
reciprocity is the key to efficient and successful communica-
tion.
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